Maq Verma, Author at Admiration Tech News

MITRE December 2023 attack: Threat actors created rogue VMs to evade detection

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

The MITRE Corporation revealed that threat actors behind the December 2023 attacks created rogue virtual machines (VMs) within its environment.

The MITRE Corporation has provided a new update about the December 2023 attack. In April 2024, MITRE disclosed a security breach in one of its research and prototyping networks. The security team at the organization promptly launched an investigation, logged out the threat actor, and engaged third-party forensics Incident Response teams to conduct independent analysis in collaboration with internal experts.

According to the MITRE Corporation, China-linked nation-state actor UNC5221 breached its systems in January 2024 by chaining two Ivanti Connect Secure zero-day vulnerabilities.

MITRE spotted the foreign nation-state threat actor probing its Networked Experimentation, Research, and Virtualization Environment (NERVE), used for research and prototyping. The organization immediately started mitigation actions which included taking NERVE offline. The investigation is still ongoing to determine the extent of information involved.

The organization notified authorities and affected parties and is working to restore operational alternatives for collaboration.

Despite MITRE diligently following industry best practices, implementing vendor recommendations, and complying with government guidance to strengthen, update, and fortify its Ivanti system, they overlooked the lateral movement into their VMware infrastructure.

The organization said that the core enterprise network or partners’ systems were not affected by this incident.

According to the new update, threat actors exploited zero-day flaws in Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) and created rogue virtual machines (VMs) within the organization’s VMware environment.

“The adversary created their own rogue VMs within the VMware environment, leveraging compromised vCenter Server access. They wrote and deployed a JSP web shell (BEEFLUSH) under the vCenter Server’s Tomcat server to execute a Python-based tunneling tool, facilitating SSH connections between adversary-created VMs and the ESXi hypervisor infrastructure.” reads the latest update. “By deploying rogue VMs, adversaries can evade detection by hiding their activities from centralized management interfaces like vCenter. This allows them to maintain control over compromised systems while minimizing the risk of discovery.”

The attackers deployed rogue virtual machines (VMs) to evade detection by hiding their activities from centralized management interfaces like vCenter. This tactic allows them to control the compromised systems while minimizing the risk of discovery.

On January 7, 3034, the adversary accessed VMs and deployed malicious payloads, including the BRICKSTORM backdoor and a web shell tracked as BEEFLUSH, enabling persistent access and arbitrary command execution.

The hackers relied on SSH manipulation and script execution to maintain control over the compromised systems. Mitre noted attackers exploiting a default VMware account to list drives and generate new VMs, one of which was removed on the same day. BRICKSTORM was discovered in directories with local persistence setups, communicating with designated C2 domains. BEEFLUSH interacted with internal IP addresses, executing dubious scripts and commands from the vCenter server’s /tmp directory

In the following days, the threat actors deployed additional payloads on the target infrastrcuture, including the WIREFIRE (aka GIFTEDVISITOR) web shell, and the BUSHWALK webshell for data exfiltration.

The threat actors exploited a default VMware account, VPXUSER, to make API calls for enumerating drives. They bypassed detection by deploying rogue VMs directly onto hypervisors, using SFTP to write files and executing them with /bin/vmx. These operations were invisible to the Center and the ESXi web interface. The rogue VMs included the BRICKSTORM backdoor and persistence mechanisms, configured with dual network interfaces for communication with both the Internet/C2 and core administrative subnets.

“Simply using the hypervisor management interface to manage VMs is often insufficient and can be pointless when it comes to dealing with rogue VMs.” continues the update. “This is because rogue VMs operate outside the standard management processes and do not adhere to established security policies, making them difficult to detect and manage through the GUI alone. Instead, one needs special tools or techniques to identify and mitigate the risks associated with rogue VMs effectively.”

MITRE shared two scripts, Invoke-HiddenVMQuery and VirtualGHOST, that allow admins to identify and mitigate potential threats within the VMware environment. The first script, developed by MITRE, Invoke-HiddenVMQuery is written in PowerShell and serves to detect malicious activities. It scans for anomalous invocations of the /bin/vmx binary within rc.local.d scripts.

“As adversaries continue to evolve their tactics and techniques, it is imperative for organizations to remain vigilant and adaptive in defending against cyber threats. By understanding and countering their new adversary behaviors, we can bolster our defenses and safeguard critical assets against future intrusions.” MITRE concludes.

LilacSquid APT targeted organizations in the U.S., Europe, and Asia since at least 2021

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

A previously undocumented APT group tracked as LilacSquid targeted organizations in the U.S., Europe, and Asia since at least 2021.

Cisco Talos researchers reported that a previously undocumented APT group, tracked as LilacSquid, conducted a data theft campaign since at least 2021.

The attacks targeted entities in multiple industries, including organizations in information technology and industrial sectors in the United States, organizations in the energy sector in Europe, and the pharmaceutical sector in Asia.

Threat actors were observed using the open-source remote management tool MeshAgent and a customized version of QuasarRAT malware tracked by Talos as PurpleInk.

PurpleInk is the primary implant in post-exploitation activity in attacks aimed at vulnerable application servers.

The attackers exploited vulnerabilities in Internet-facing application servers and compromised remote desktop protocol (RDP) credentials to deploy a variety of open-source tools, including MeshAgent and Secure Socket Funneling (SSF), alongside customized malware, such as “PurpleInk,” and “InkBox” and “InkLoader loaders.” The Secure Socket Funneling (SSF) tool allows attackers to proxy and tunnel multiple sockets through a secure TLS tunnel.

The threat actors aim to establish long-term access to compromised victims’ organizations to steal sensitive data.

The researchers pointed out that LilacSquid’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) overlap with North Korea-linked APT groups such as Andariel and Lazarus. The Andariel APT group has been reported using MeshAgent for post-compromise access, while Lazarus extensively uses SOCKs proxy and tunneling tools along with custom malware to maintain persistence and data exfiltration. LilacSquid similarly uses SSF and other malware to create tunnels to their remote servers.

InkLoader is .NET-based loader designed to run a hardcoded executable or command. It supports persistence mechanism and was spotted deploying PurpleInk.

LilacSquid uses InkLoader in conjunction with PurpleInk when they can create and maintain remote desktop (RDP) sessions using stolen credentials. After a successful RDP login, attackers downloaded InkLoader and PurpleInk, copied to specific directories, and InkLoader is registered as a service. The service is used to launch the InkLoader, which in turn deploys PurpleInk.

PurpleInk is actively developed since 2021, it relies on a configuration file to obtain information such as the command and control (C2) server’s address and port, which is typically base64-decoded and decrypted.

PurpleInk is heavily obfuscated and versatile, the malware supports multiple RAT capabilities including:

Enumerating processes and sending details to the C2.
Terminating specified processes.
Running new applications.
Gathering drive information.
Enumerating directories and obtaining file details.
Reading and exfiltrating specified files.
Replacing or appending content to specified files.

Talos also observed the APT using a custom tool called InkBox to deploy PurpleInk prior to InkLoader.

“InkBox is a malware loader that will read from a hardcoded file path on disk and decrypt its contents. The decrypted content is another executable assembly that is then run by invoking its Entry Point within the InkBox process.” reads the analysis published by Talos.

The researchers provided Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) for the above threats on GitHub.

FlyingYeti targets Ukraine using WinRAR exploit to deliver COOKBOX Malware

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

Russia-linked threat actor FlyingYeti is targeting Ukraine with a phishing campaign to deliver the PowerShell malware COOKBOX.

Cloudflare researchers discovered phishing campaign conducted by a Russia-linked threat actor FlyingYeti (aka UAC-0149) targeting Ukraine. The experts published a report to describe real-time effort to disrupt and delay this threat activity.

At the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Ukraine implemented a moratorium on evictions and termination of utility services for unpaid debt. The moratorium ended in January 2024, leading to significant debt liability and increased financial stress for Ukrainian citizens. The FlyingYeti campaign exploited this anxiety by using debt-themed lures to trick targets into opening malicious links embedded in the messages. Upon opening the files, the PowerShell malware COOKBOX infects the target system, allowing the attackers to deploy additional payloads and gain control over the victim’s system.

The threat actors exploited the WinRAR vulnerability CVE-2023-38831 to infect targets with malware.

Cloudflare states that FlyingYeti’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are similar to the ones detailed by Ukraine CERT while analyzing UAC-0149 cluster.

UAC-0149 targeted Ukrainian defense entities with COOKBOX malware since at least the fall of 2023.

“The threat actor uses dynamic DNS (DDNS) for their infrastructure and leverages cloud-based platforms for hosting malicious content and for malware command and control (C2).” reads the report published by Cloudflare. “Our investigation of FlyingYeti TTPs suggests this is likely a Russia-aligned threat group. The actor appears to primarily focus on targeting Ukrainian military entities.”

Threat actors targeted users with a spoofed version of the Kyiv Komunalka communal housing site (https://www.komunalka.ua), hosted on an actor-controlled GitHub page (hxxps[:]//komunalka[.]github[.]io). Komunalka is a payment processor for utilities and other services in the Kyiv region.

FlyingYeti likely directed targets to this page via phishing emails or encrypted Signal messages. On the spoofed site, a large green button prompted users to download a document named “Рахунок.docx” (“Invoice.docx”), which instead downloaded a malicious archive titled “Заборгованість по ЖКП.rar” (“Debt for housing and utility services.rar”).

Once the RAR file is opened, the CVE-2023-38831 exploit triggers the execution of the COOKBOX malware.

The RAR archive contains multiple files, including one with the Unicode character “U+201F,” which appears as whitespace on Windows systems. This character can hide file extensions by adding excessive whitespace, making a malicious CMD file (“Рахунок на оплату.pdf[unicode character U+201F].cmd”) look like a PDF document. The archive also includes a benign PDF with the same name minus the Unicode character. Upon opening the archive, the directory name also matches the benign PDF name. This naming overlap exploits the WinRAR vulnerability CVE-2023-38831, causing the malicious CMD to execute when the target attempts to open the benign PDF.

“The CMD file contains the Flying Yeti PowerShell malware known as COOKBOX. The malware is designed to persist on a host, serving as a foothold in the infected device. Once installed, this variant of COOKBOX will make requests to the DDNS domain postdock[.]serveftp[.]com for C2, awaiting PowerShell cmdlets that the malware will subsequently run.” continues the report. “Alongside COOKBOX, several decoy documents are opened, which contain hidden tracking links using the Canary Tokens service.”

The report also provide recommendations and Indicators of Compromise (IoCs).

APT28 targets key networks in Europe with HeadLace malware

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

Russia-linked APT28 used the HeadLace malware and credential-harvesting web pages in attacks against networks across Europe.

Researchers at Insikt Group observed Russian GRU’s unit APT28 targeting networks across Europe with information-stealer Headlace and credential-harvesting web pages. The experts observed the APT deploying Headlace in three distinct phases from April to December 2023, respectively, using phishing, compromised internet services, and living off the land binaries. The credential harvesting pages were designed to target Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence, European transportation infrastructures, and an Azerbaijani think tank. The credential harvesting pages created by the group can defeat two-factor authentication and CAPTCHA challenges by relaying requests between legitimate services and compromised Ubiquiti routers.

In some attackers, threat actors created specially-crafted web pages on Mocky that interact with a Python script running on compromised Ubiquiti routers to exfiltrate the provided credentials.

The compromise of networks associated with Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence and European railway systems could allow attackers to gather intelligence to influence battlefield tactics and broader military strategies. Additionally, their interest in the Azerbaijan Center for Economic and Social Development indicates a potential agenda to understand and possibly influence regional policies.

Insikt Group speculates the operation is aimed at influencing regional and military dynamics.

The APT28 group (aka Fancy Bear, Pawn Storm, Sofacy Group, Sednit, BlueDelta, and STRONTIUM) has been active since at least 2007 and it has targeted governments, militaries, and security organizations worldwide. The group was involved also in the string of attacks that targeted 2016 Presidential election.

The group operates out of military unity 26165 of the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS).

The attack chain used in the attacks detailed by Insikt Group has seven distinct infrastructure stages to filter out sandboxes, incompatible operating systems, and non-targeted countries. Victims who failed these checks downloaded a benign file and were redirected to Microsoft’s web portal, msn.com. Those who passed the checks downloaded a malicious Windows BAT script, which connected to a free API service to execute successive shell commands.

In December 2023, researchers from Proofpoint and IBM detailed a new wave of APT spear-phishing attacks relying on multiple lure content to deliver Headlace malware. The campaigns targeted at least thirteen separate nations.

“Upon analyzing Headlace geofencing scripts and countries targeted by credential harvesting campaigns from 2022 onwards, Insikt Group identified that thirteen separate countries were targeted by BlueDelta. As expected, Ukraine topped the list, accounting for 40% of the activity.” reads the report published by the Insikt Group. “Türkiye might seem like an unexpected target with 10%, but it’s important to note that it was singled out only by Headlace geofencing, unlike Ukraine, Poland, and Azerbaijan, which were targeted through both Headlace geofencing and credential harvesting.”

Researchers call on organizations within government, military, defense, and related sectors, to bolster cybersecurity measures: prioritizing the detection of sophisticated phishing attempts, restricting access to non-essential internet services, and enhancing surveillance of critical network infrastructure.

UAC-0020 threat actor used the SPECTR Malware to target Ukraine’s defense forces

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

Ukraine CERT-UA warned of cyber attacks targeting defense forces with SPECTR malware as part of a cyber espionage campaign dubbed SickSync.

The Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) warned of cyber espionage campaign targeting defense forces in the country. The Ukrainian CERT attributes the attack to the threat actor UAC-0020 which employed a malware called SPECTR as part of the campaign tracked as SickSync.

The threat actor UAC-0020, aka Vermin, operates under the control of the law enforcement agencies of the temporarily occupied Luhansk.

The SPECTR malware has been active since at least 2019, it allows operators to steal sensitive data and files from the infected computer, it relies on the standard synchronization functionality of the legitimate SyncThing software.

Threat actors sent out spear-phishing messages with an attachment in the form of a password-protected archive named “turrel.fop.vovchok.rar”.

The archive contains another archive, named RARSFX archive (“turrel.fop.ovchok.sfx.rar.scr”) that contains the “Wowchok.pdf” decoy file, the “sync.exe” EXE installer created using InnoSetup, and the BAT file ” run_user.bat” used for initial startup.

The UA-CERT states that the “sync.exe” file contains the legitimate SyncThing components and SPECTR malware files, including additional libraries and scripts. Attackers modified the standard files of the SyncThing software to change the names of directories, scheduled tasks, disable the functionality of displaying messages to the user, etc.

The SPECTR information stealer can capture screenshots every 10 seconds, collect files, extract data from removable USB drives, and steal credentials from web browsers and applications like Element, Signal, Skype, and Telegram.

“It should be noted that the stolen information is copied to subfolders in the directory %APPDATA%\sync\Slave_Sync\, after which, using the standard synchronization functionality of the legitimate program SyncThing , the contents of these directories get to the attacker’s computer, which ensures data exfiltration.” reads the report from the CERT-UA. “From the point of view of network indicators (in case of confidence in not using the mentioned technology is authorized), taking into account the establishment of a peer-to-peer connection, among other things, we recommend paying attention to signs of interaction with the SyncThing infrastructure: *.syncthing.net.”

The report also includes indicators of cyber threats.

Sticky Werewolf targets the aviation industry in Russia and Belarus

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

Morphisec researchers observed a threat actor, tracked as Sticky Werewolf, targeting entities in Russia and Belarus.

Sticky Werewolf is a threat actor that was first spotted in April 2023, initially targeting public organizations in Russia and Belarus. The group has expanded its operations to various sectors, including a pharmaceutical company and a Russian research institute specializing in microbiology and vaccine development.

In their latest campaign, Sticky Werewolf targeted the aviation industry with emails supposedly from the First Deputy General Director of AO OKB Kristall, a Moscow-based company involved in aircraft and spacecraft production and maintenance. Previously, the group used phishing emails with links to malicious files. In the latest campaign, the threat actor used archive files containing LNK files that pointed to a payload stored on WebDAV servers.

After executing the binary hosted on a WebDAV server, an obfuscated Windows batch script is launched. The script runs an AutoIt script that ultimately injects the final payload.

“In previous campaigns, the infection chain began with phishing emails containing a link to download a malicious file from platforms like gofile.io. However, in their latest campaign, the infection method has changed.” reads the analysis published by Morphisec. “The initial email includes an archive attachment; when the recipient extracts the archive, they find LNK and decoy files. These LNK files point to an executable hosted on a WebDAV server. Once executed, this initiates a Batch script, which then launches an AutoIt script that ultimately injects the final payload.”

The archive includes a decoy PDF File and two LNK Files Masquerading as DOCX Documents named Повестка совещания.docx.lnk (Meeting agenda) and Список рассылки.docx.lnk (Mailing list) respectively.

The threat actor used phishing messages allegedly sent by the First Deputy General Director and Executive Director of AO OKB Kristall. The recipients are individuals from the aerospace and defense sector who are invited to a video conference on future cooperation. The messages use a password-protected archive containing a malicious payload.

The payloads employed by the threat actors include commodity RATs or stealers. Recently, Sticky Werewolf was spotted using Rhadamanthys Stealer and Ozone RAT in their campaigns. In previous attacks the group also deployed MetaStealer, DarkTrack, and NetWire.

“These malwares enable extensive espionage and data exfiltration. While there is no definitive evidence of Sticky Werewolf’s national origin, the geopolitical context suggests possible links to a pro-Ukrainian cyberespionage group or hacktivists, though this attribution remains uncertain.” concludes the report that also includes Indicators of Compromise (IoCs).

China-linked Velvet Ant uses F5 BIG-IP malware in cyber espionage campaign

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

Chinese cyberespionage group Velvet Ant was spotted using custom malware to target F5 BIG-IP appliances to breach target networks.

In late 2023, Sygnia researchers responded to an incident suffered by a large organization that they attributed to a China-linked threat actor tracked as ‘Velvet Ant.’

The cyberspies deployed custom malware on F5 BIG-IP appliances to gain persistent access to the internal network of the target organization and steal sensitive data.

The investigation revealed that the threat actor had been present in the organization’s on-premises network for about three years, aiming to maintain access for espionage purposes. They achieved persistence by establishing multiple footholds within the company’s environment. One method used was exploiting a legacy F5 BIG-IP appliance exposed to the internet, which served as an internal Command and Control (C&C). When one foothold was discovered and remediated, the threat actor quickly adapted and pivoted to another. This demonstrated their agility and deep understanding of the target’s network infrastructure.

The investigation revealed that the Chinese hackers had been present in the organization’s on-premises network for about three years. They achieved persistence by establishing multiple footholds within the company’s environment. One method used was exploiting a legacy internet-facing F5 BIG-IP appliance, which was also used by attackers as an internal Command and Control (C&C). After the researchers discovered and remediated one foothold, the APT group quickly pivoted to another. This demonstrated their agility and deep understanding of the target’s network infrastructure.

“The compromised organization had two F5 BIG-IP appliances which provided services such as firewall, WAF, load balancing and local traffic management. These appliances were directly exposed to the internet, and both of which were compromised. Both F5 appliances were running an outdated, vulnerable, operating system. The threat actor may have leveraged one of the vulnerabilities to gain remote access to the appliances.” reads the analysis published by Sygnia. “As a result, a backdoor hidden within the F5 appliance can evade detection from traditional log monitoring solutions.”

Once the attackers had compromised the F5 BIG-IP appliances, they gained access to internal file servers and deployed the PlugX RAT. The PlugX RAT was used by multiple Chinese APT groups in cyberespionage campaigns over the years.

Forensic analysis of the F5 appliances revealed that the Velvet Ant group also used the following malware in their attacks:

VELVETSTING – a tool that connects to the threat actor’s C&C once an hour, searching commands to execute. Once the tool received a command, it was executed via ‘csh’ (Unix C shell).
VELVETTAP – a tool with the ability to capture network packets.
SAMRID – identified as ‘EarthWorm’, an open-source SOCKS proxy tunneller available on GitHub. The tool was utilized in the past by multiple China-linked APT groups, including ‘Volt Typhoon’, ‘APT27’ and ‘Gelsemium’.
ESRDE – a tool with similar capabilities to that of ‘VELVETSTING’, but with minor differences, such as using bash instead of ‘csh’.

Researchers provided the following recommendations for organizations to mitigate attacks of groups like Velvet Ant:

Limit outbound internet traffic.
Limit lateral movement throughout the network.
Enhance security hardening of legacy servers.
Mitigate credential harvesting.
Protect public-facing devices.

The report also includes indicators of compromise for the attack analyzed by the researchers.

China-linked spies target Asian Telcos since at least 2021

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

A China-linked cyber espionage group has compromised telecom operators in an Asian country since at least 2021.

The Symantec Threat Hunter Team reported that an alleged China-linked APT group has infiltrated several telecom operators in a single, unnamed, Asian country at least since 2021.

The threat actors used tools associated with Chinese espionage groups, they planted multiple backdoors on the networks of targeted companies to steal credentials.

“The attacks have been underway since at least 2021, with evidence to suggest that some of this activity may even date as far back as 2020. Virtually all of the organizations targeted were telecoms operators, with the addition of a services company that serves the telecoms sector and a university in another Asian country.” reads the report published by Broadcom Symantec Threat Hunter Team.

Evidence collected by the experts suggests that the cluster activity may have been active since 2020.

In a recent espionage campaign, the attackers employed custom malware associated with several Chinese APT groups. Some of the malware used by the threat actors are:

Coolclient: A backdoor linked to the Fireant group (also known as Mustang Panda or Earth Preta). It logs keystrokes, manages files, and communicates with a C2 server. This campaign used a version of VLC Media Player (disguised as googleupdate.exe) to sideload a Coolclient loader, which then reads and executes encrypted payloads.
Quickheal: A backdoor associated with the Needleminer group (also known as RedFoxtrot or Nomad Panda). The variant used by the attackers in recent attacks was a 32-bit DLL that communicated with a hardcoded C&C server using a custom protocol mimicking SSL traffic.
Rainyday: A backdoor, linked to the Firefly group (also known as Naikon), was used in a recent espionage campaign.

In addition to utilizing custom backdoors. the cyber espionage group also employed a range of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to compromise their targets. They deployed custom keylogging malware, port scanning tools, credential theft through the dumping of registry hives, a publicly available tool known as Responder that acts as a Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) and multicast DNS (mDNS) poisoner, and enabling RDP.

“Tools used in this campaign have strong associations with multiple Chinese groups and at least three of the custom backdoors deployed are believed to be used exclusively by Chinese espionage actors.” concludes the report.” “The nature of the link between the actors involved in the current campaign remains unclear. Possibilities include, but are not limited to:

Attacks by multiple actors, acting independently of one another.
A single actor using tools and/or personnel acquired from or shared by other groups.
Multiple actors collaborating in a single campaign.

The ultimate motive of the intrusion campaign remains unclear.”

Russia-linked APT Nobelium targets French diplomatic entities

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

French information security agency ANSSI reported that Russia-linked threat actor Nobelium is behind a series of cyber attacks that targeted French diplomatic entities.

The French information security agency ANSSI reported that Russia-linked APT Nobelium targeted French diplomatic entities. Despite the French agency linked the attacks to the cyberespionage group Nobelium (aka APT29, SVR group, Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, BlueBravo, and The Dukes), ANSSI differentiates these groups into separate threat clusters, including a group named Dark Halo, which was responsible for the 2020 SolarWinds attack.

October 2020, used against high-value targets, most likely for espionage purposes. Western diplomatic entities, such as embassies and Ministries of Foreign Affairs, account for the majority of known victims of Nobelium. However, several IT companies have also reported that they have been targeted by Nobelium’s operators in late 2023 and 2024.

The report published by ANSSI is based upon elements collected by the French agency, evidence shared by its national partners (known as C4 members), and publicly available reports. The document warns of phishing campaigns conducted by Nobelium against French public and diplomatic entities aiming at gathering strategic intelligence.

“Nobelium is characterized by the use of specific codes, tactics, technics and procedures. Most of Nobelium campaigns against diplomatic entities use compromised legitimate email accounts belonging to diplomatic staff, and conduct phishing campaigns against diplomatic institutions, embassies and consulates.” reads the report published by ANSSI. “These activities are also publicly described as a campaign called “Diplomatic Orbiter”.”

Attackers forge lure documents to target diplomatic staff, attempting to deliver their custom loaders to drop public post-exploitation tools such as Cobalt Strike or Brute Ratel C4. The tools allows attackers to access the victim’s network, perform lateral movements, drop additional payloads, maintain persistence, and exfiltrate valuable intelligence.

The agency confirmed that several IT companies have also reported being targeted by Nobelium in late 2023 and 2024.

“French public organisations have been targeted several times by phishing emails sent from foreign institutions previously compromised by Nobelium’s operators.” continues the report. “From February to May 2021, Nobelium operators conducted several phishing campaigns3 exploiting compromised email accounts belonging to the French Ministry of Culture and the National Agency for Territorial Cohesion (ANCT), sending an attachment called “Strategic Review”.”

In March 2022, a European embassy in South Africa received a phishing email that impersonated a French embassy, announcing the closure after a terrorist attack. The attackers sent the email from a compromised account of a French diplomat. In April and May 2022, Nobelium phishing messages reached dozens of email addresses from the French Ministry of Foreign Affair. Threat actors used themes like the closure of a Ukrainian embassy or a meeting with a Portuguese ambassador.

In May 2023, Nobelium targeted several European embassies in Kyiv, including the French embassy, with a phishing campaign involving an email about a “Diplomatic car for sale.” The ANSSI also reported a failed attempt to compromise the French Embassy in Romania.

“ANSSI has observed a high level of activities linked to Nobelium against the recent backdrop of geopolitical tensions, especially in Europe, in relation to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Nobelium’s activities against government and diplomatic entities represent a national security concern and endanger French and European diplomatic interests. The targeting of IT and cybersecurity entities for espionage purposes by Nobelium operators potentially strengthens their offensive capabilities and the threat they represent.” concludes the report that also provides indicators of compromise. “Nobelium’s techniques, tactics, and procedures remain mainly constant over time.”

Russia-linked group APT29 likely breached TeamViewer’s corporate network

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

Russia-linked APT group, reportedly APT29, is suspected to be behind a hack of TeamViewer ‘s corporate network.

TeamViewer discovered that a threat actor has breached its corporate network and some reports attribute the intrusion to the Russia-linked APT group APT29 (aka SVR group, BlueBravo, Cozy Bear, Nobelium, Midnight Blizzard, and The Dukes).

The unauthorized access to the IT infrastructure of the company occurred on June 26, threat actors used the credentials of a standard employee account within its IT environment.

Upon detecting the suspicious activity by this account, the company immediately started the incident response measures.

“A comprehensive taskforce consisting of TeamViewer’s security team together with globally leading cyber security experts has worked 24/7 on investigating the incident with all means available. We are in constant exchange with additional threat intelligence providers and relevant authorities to inform the investigation.” reads the statement published by the company.

“Current findings of the investigation point to an attack on Wednesday, June 26, tied to credentials of a standard employee account within our Corporate IT environment. Based on continuous security monitoring, our teams identified suspicious behavior of this account and immediately put incident response measures into action. Together with our external incident response support, we currently attribute this activity to the threat actor known as APT29 / Midnight Blizzard. Based on current findings of the investigation, the attack was contained within the Corporate IT environment and there is no evidence that the threat actor gained access to our product environment or customer data.”

An update published by TeamViewer states that findings confirmed that the attack on its infrastructure was limited to its internal corporate IT environment and did not affect the product environment, connectivity platform, or any customer data.

The popular Ars Technica reporter Dan Goodin reported that an alert issued by security firm NCC Group reports a “significant compromise of the TeamViewer remote access and support platform by an APT group.”

In May 2019, the German newspaper Der Spiegel revealed that the German software company behind TeamViewer was compromised in 2016 by Chinese hackers.

According to the media outlet, Chinese state-sponsored hackers used the Winnti trojan malware to infect the systems of the Company.

The Winnti group was first spotted by Kaspersky in 2013, according to the researchers, the nation-state actor has been active since at least 2007.

The gang is financially-motivated and was mostly involved in cyber espionage campaigns. The hackers were known for targeting companies in the online gaming industry, the majority of the victims are located in Southeast Asia.

The Winnti cyberespionage group is known for its ability in targeting supply chains of legitimate software to spread malware.

According to the company, it was targeted by the hackers in autumn 2016, when its experts detected suspicious activities were quickly blocked them to prevent major damages.

TeamViewer spokesperson revealed that the company investigated the attempts of intrusion, but did not find any evidence of exposure for customer data and sensitive data.

Der Spiegel pointed out that TeamViewer did not disclose the security breach to the public.

“In autumn 2016, TeamViewer was target of a cyber-attack. Our systems detected the suspicious activities in time to prevent any major damage. An expert team of internal and external cyber security researchers, working together closely with the responsible authorities, successfully fended off the attack and with all available means of IT forensics found no evidence that customer data or other sensitive information had been stolen, that customer computer systems had been infected or that the TeamViewer source code had been manipulated, stolen or misused in any other way.” said company spokesman.

“Out of an abundance of caution, TeamViewer conducted a comprehensive audit of its security architecture and IT infrastructure subsequently and further strengthened it with appropriate measures.”

At the time the company published a statement to exclude it was breached by hackers:

“Göppingen/Germany, May 23, 2016. A recent article warns, “TeamViewer users have had their bank accounts emptied by hackers gaining full-system access”. TeamViewer is appalled by any criminal activity; however, the source of the problem, according to our research, is careless use, not a potential security breach on TeamViewer’s side.” wrote the company.

Only in 2019, the company admitted it was breached in 2016.

China-linked APT exploited Cisco NX-OS zero-day to deploy custom malware

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

Cisco fixed an actively exploited NX-OS zero-day, the flaw was exploited to install previously unknown malware as root on vulnerable switches.

Cisco addressed an NX-OS zero-day, tracked as CVE-2024-20399 (CVSS score of 6.0), that the China-linked group Velvet Ant exploited to deploy previously unknown malware as root on vulnerable switches.

The flaw resides in the CLI of Cisco NX-OS Software, an authenticated, local attacker can exploit the flaw to execute arbitrary commands as root on the underlying operating system of an affected device.

“This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of arguments that are passed to specific configuration CLI commands. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by including crafted input as the argument of an affected configuration CLI command.” reads the advisory published by Cisco. “A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with the privileges of root.”

The IT giant pointed out that only attackers with Administrator credentials can successfully exploit this vulnerability on a Cisco NX-OS device.

In April 2024, researchers reported to the Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) that the issue was actively exploited in the wild.

Cybersecurity firm Sygnia observed the attacks on April 2024 and reported them to Cisco.

“Sygnia identified that CVE-2024-20399 was exploited in the wild by a China-nexus threat group as a ‘zero-day’ and shared the details of the vulnerability with Cisco. By exploiting this vulnerability, a threat group – dubbed ‘Velvet Ant’ – successfully executed commands on the underlying operating system of Cisco Nexus devices.” reads the report published by Sygnia. “This exploitation led to the execution of a previously unknown custom malware that allowed the threat group to remotely connect to compromised Cisco Nexus devices, upload additional files, and execute code on the devices.“

The vulnerability impacts the following devices:

MDS 9000 Series Multilayer Switches (CSCwj97007)
Nexus 3000 Series Switches (CSCwj97009)
Nexus 5500 Platform Switches (CSCwj97011)
Nexus 5600 Platform Switches (CSCwj97011)
Nexus 6000 Series Switches (CSCwj97011)
Nexus 7000 Series Switches (CSCwj94682) *
Nexus 9000 Series Switches in standalone NX-OS mode (CSCwj97009)

Cisco recommends customers monitor the use of credentials for the administrative users network-admin and vdc-admin.

Cisco provides the Cisco Software Checker to help customers determine if their devices are vulnerable to this flaw.

In late 2023, Sygnia researchers responded to an incident suffered by a large organization that they attributed to the same China-linked threat actor ‘Velvet Ant.’

The cyberspies deployed custom malware on F5 BIG-IP appliances to gain persistent access to the internal network of the target organization and steal sensitive data.

Multiple cybersecurity agencies warn of China-linked APT40 ‘s capabilities

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

Multiple cybersecurity agencies released a joint advisory warning about a China-linked group APT40 ‘s capability to rapidly exploit disclosed security flaws.

Cybersecurity agencies from Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the U.K., and the U.S. released a joint advisory warning about the China-linked group APT40 (aka TEMP.Periscope, TEMP.Jumper, Bronze Mohawk, Gingham Typhoon, ISLANDDREAMS, Kryptonite Panda, Red Ladon, TA423, and Leviathan) and its capability to rapidly exploit disclosed flaws

The China-linked group was able to exploit vulnerabilities within hours or days of the public disclosure.

APT40 has previously targeted organizations in countries like Australia and the United States. The group is able to rapidly adapt vulnerability proofs of concept (POCs) for their operations. They identify new exploits in widely used public software, such as Log4J, Atlassian Confluence, and Microsoft Exchange, to target the associated infrastructure.

“APT 40 has previously targeted organizations in various countries, including Australia and the United States. Notably, APT 40 possesses the ability to quickly transform and adapt vulnerability proofs of concept (POCs) for targeting, reconnaissance, and exploitation operations.” reads the advisory. “APT 40 identifies new exploits within widely used public software such as Log4J, Atlassian Confluence and Microsoft Exchange to target the infrastructure of the associated vulnerability.“

In July 2021, the U.S. Justice Department (DoJ) indicted four members of the cyber espionage group APT40 (aka TEMP.Periscope, TEMP.Jumper, and Leviathan) for hacking tens of government organizations, private businesses and universities around the world between 2011 and 2018.

The APT40 group has been active since at least 2013, it is focused on targeting countries important to the country’s Belt and Road Initiative (i.e. Cambodia, Belgium, Germany, Hong Kong, Philippines, Malaysia, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, the United States, and the United Kingdom).

The group appears to be focused on supporting the naval modernization efforts of the Government of Beijing. Threat actors target engineering, transportation, and defense sectors, experts observed a specific interest in maritime technologies.

The cyberspies also targeted research centres and universities involved in naval research with the intent to access advanced technology to push the growth of the Chinese naval industry. The list of victims of the APT40 group also includes organizations with operations in Southeast Asia or involved in South China Sea disputes.

Three of the defendants are said to be officers in a provincial arm of the MSS and one was an employee of a front company that was used to obfuscate the government’s role in the hacking campaigns.

“APT40 regularly conducts reconnaissance against networks of interest, including networks in the authoring agencies’ countries, looking for opportunities to compromise its targets. This regular reconnaissance postures the group to identify vulnerable, end-of-life or no longer maintained devices on networks of interest, and to rapidly deploy exploits. APT40 continues to find success exploiting vulnerabilities from as early as 2017.” continues the joint advisory. “APT40 rapidly exploits newly public vulnerabilities in widely used software such as Log4J (CVE-2021-44228), Atlassian Confluence (CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-26084) and Microsoft Exchange (CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-34473). ASD’s ACSC and the authoring agencies expect the group to continue using POCs for new high-profile vulnerabilities within hours or days of public release.”

APT40 use to exploit vulnerable public-facing infrastructure over other hacking techniques like phishing. They prioritize obtaining valid credentials for subsequent activities. The group often relies on web shells to maintain persistence early in an intrusion. Persistence is established early in an intrusion, making it likely to be observed in all cases, regardless of the level of compromise or further actions taken.

In the past, the APT40 was observed using compromised Australian websites as C2 servers, however he recently evolved this technique.

“APT40 has embraced the global trend of using compromised devices, including small-office/home-office (SOHO) devices, as operational infrastructure and last-hop redirectors [T1584.008] for its operations in Australia. This has enabled the authoring agencies to better characterize and track this group’s movements.” continues the report.

Many of the compromised SOHO devices are end-of-life or unpatched that can be easily hacked using N-day exploits. Compromised SOHO (Small Office/Home Office) devices provide attackers with a platform to launch attacks by mimicking legitimate traffic.

The report provides details about Tactics, Techniques, and Procesured associated by the the group and detection and mitigation recommendations.

Void Banshee exploits CVE-2024-38112 zero-day to spread malware

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

Void Banshee APT group exploited the Windows zero-day CVE-2024-38112 to execute code via the disabled Internet Explorer.

An APT group tracked as Void Banshee was spotted exploiting the Windows zero-day CVE-2024-38112 (CVSS score of 7.5) to execute code through the disabled Internet Explorer.

The vulnerability is a Windows MSHTML Platform Spoofing Vulnerability. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires an attacker to take additional actions before exploitation to prepare the target environment. An attacker can trigger the issue by sending the victim a malicious file that the victim would have to execute.

Trend Micro researchers discovered that the flaw was actively exploited in the wild in May and reported it to Microsoft which addressed the zero-day with the July 2024 Patch Tuesday security updates.

Void Banshee was observed exploiting the CVE-2024-38112 flaw to drop the Atlantida info-stealer on the victims’ machines. The malware allows operators to gather system information and steal sensitive data, such as passwords and cookies, from multiple applications.

In the group’s attack chain, Void Banshee attempts to trick victims into opening zip archives containing malicious files disguised as book PDFs. The archives are disseminated in cloud-sharing websites, Discord servers, and online libraries, and other means. The APT group focuses on North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia.

“This zero-day attack is a prime example of how unsupported Windows relics are an overlooked attack surface that can still be exploited by threat actors to infect unsuspecting users with ransomware, backdoors, or as a conduit for other kinds of malware.” states Trend Micro.

Void Banshee exploited the disabled Internet Explorer process to run HTML Application (HTA) files using specially crafted .URL files with the MHTML protocol handler and the x-usc! directive. This technique resembles the exploitation of CVE-2021-40444, another MSHTML flaw that was exploited in zero-day attacks. The experts warn that this attack method is very concerning because Internet Explorer no longer receives updates or security fixes.

“In this attack, CVE-2024-38112 was used as a zero-day to redirect a victim by opening and using the system-disabled IE to a compromised website which hosted a malicious HTML Application (HTA)” states the report. “In the URL parameter of the internet shortcut file, we can see that Void Banshee specifically crafted this URL string using the MHTML protocol handler along with the x-usc! directive. This logic string opens the URL target in the native Internet Explorer through the iexplore.exe process.”

Attackers used the internet shortcut file to direct the victims to an attacker-controlled domain where an HTML file downloads the HTA stage of the infection chain. The researchers noticed that Void Banshee uses this HTML file to control the window view size of Internet Explorer, hiding browser information and hiding the download of the next infection stage from the victim.

By default, IE prompts users to open or save the HTML application, but the APT group disguised the HTA file as a PDF by adding spaces to the file extension. Upon running the HTA file, a series of scripts is executed, along with the LoadToBadXml .NET trojan loader, the Donut shellcode, and the Atlantida stealer.

“In this campaign, we have observed that even though users may no longer be able to access IE, threat actors can still exploit lingering Windows relics like IE on their machine to infect users and organizations with ransomware, backdoors, or as a proxy to execute other strains of malware.” Trend Micro concludes. “The ability of APT groups like Void Banshee to exploit disabled services such as IE poses a significant threat to organizations worldwide. Since services such as IE have a large attack surface and no longer receive patches, it represents a serious security concern to Windows users.”

China-linked APT group uses new Macma macOS backdoor version

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

China-linked APT group Daggerfly (aka Evasive Panda, Bronze Highland) Evasive Panda has been spotted using an updated version of the macOS backdoor Macma.

The China-linked APT group Daggerfly (aka Evasive Panda or Bronze Highland) has significantly updated its malware arsenal, adding a new malware family based on the MgBot framework and an updated Macma macOS backdoor.

“The Daggerfly (aka Evasive Panda, Bronze Highland) espionage group has extensively updated its toolset, introducing several new versions of its malware, most likely in response to exposure of older variants.” reads the report. “The new tooling was deployed in a number of recent attacks against organizations in Taiwan and a U.S. NGO based in China, which indicates the group also engages in internal espionage. In the attack on this organization, the attackers exploited a vulnerability in an Apache HTTP server to deliver their MgBot malware.“

The APT group was spotted using the malware families in attacks against Taiwanese organizations and a U.S. NGO in China. The attackers exploited an Apache HTTP server vulnerability to deliver their MgBot malware.

Daggerfly has been active for at least a decade, the group is known for the use of the custom MgBot malware framework. In 2023, Symantec identified a Daggerfly intrusion at an African telecom operator, using new MgBot plugins. This highlights the group’s ongoing evolution in cyber espionage tactics.

The Macma macOS backdoor was first detailed by Google in 2021 and has been used since at least 2019. At the time of discovery, threat actors employed the malware in watering hole attacks involving compromised websites in Hong Kong. The watering hole attacks used exploits for iOS and macOS devices. Attackers exploited the privilege escalation vulnerability CVE-2021-30869 to install Macma on macOS devices.

Macma is a modular backdoor that supports multiple functionalities, including device fingerprinting, executing commands, screen capture, keylogging, audio capture, uploading and downloading files.

Although Macma was widely used in cyber operations carried out by nation-state actors, it was not linked to a particular group. However, Symantec has found evidence to suggest that it is part of the Daggerfly toolkit. Two variants of the Macma backdoor C2 server (103.243.212[.]98) that was also used by an MgBot dropper.

In addition to this shared infrastructure, Macma and other malware in the Daggerfly’s arsenal, including Mgbot all contain code from a single, shared library or framework. Elements of this library have been used to build Windows, macOS, Linux, and Android threats. The functionality provided by this library includes:

Threading and synchronization primitives
Event notifications and timers
Data marshaling
Platform-independent abstractions (e.g. time)

The new variants used by Daggerfly implement the following additions/improvements:

New logic to collect a file’s system listing, with the new code based on Tree, a publicly available Linux/Unix utility.
Modified code in the AudioRecorderHelper feature
Additional parametrisation
Additional debug logging
Addition of a new file (param2.ini) to set options to adjust screenshot size and aspect ratio

The experts also observed another malware, tracked as Suzafk (aka ‘NetMM’, Nightdoor), in the group toolkit that ESET researchers linked to Evasive Panda in March.

“Suzafk is a multi-staged backdoor capable of using TCP or OneDrive for C&C. The malware contained the following configuration, indicating the functionality to connect to OneDrive is in development or present in other variants of the malware.” continues the report.

The backdoor includes the code from the al-khaser project, a public code repository developed to avoid detection by detecting virtual machines, sandboxes, and malware analysis environments.

The malware can also execute commands for network and system monitoring, such as ‘ipconfig,’ ‘systeminfo,’ ‘tasklist,’ and ‘netstat.’

“The [Daggerfly] group can create versions of its tools targeting most major operating system platforms.” concludes the report. “In addition to the tools documented here, Symantec has seen evidence of the ability to Trojanize Android APKs, SMS interception tools, DNS request interception tools, and even malware families targeting Solaris OS. Daggerfly appears to be capable of responding to exposure by quickly updating its toolset to continue its espionage activities with minimal disruption.”

Belarus-linked APT Ghostwriter targeted Ukraine with PicassoLoader malware

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

Belarus-linked APT group GhostWriter targeted Ukrainian organizations with a malware family known as PicassoLoader, used to deliver various malicious payloads.

The Ukrainian Government’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UA) reported a surge in activity associated with the APT group UAC-0057 (aka GhostWriter) group between July 12 and 18, 2024. Threat actors distributed documents containing macros designed to deploy the PICASSOLOADER malware on victim computers, which then delivered the post-exploitation tool Cobalt Strike Beacon.

The attackers used bait documents related to local government reform (USAID/DAI “HOVERLA” project), taxation, and financial-economic metrics (“oborona.rar,” “66_oborona_PURGED.xls,” “trix.xls,” “equipment_survey_regions_.xls,” “accounts.xls,” “spreadsheet.xls,” “attachment.xls,” “Податок_2024.xls”).

“Based on this, it can be inferred that UAC-0057 might have targeted both project office specialists and their counterparts among the employees of relevant local government bodies in Ukraine.” reads the report published by CERT-UA.

The campaign was likely part of a broader cyber espionage activity against the Ukrainian government.

In November 2021, Mandiant Threat Intelligence researchers linked the Ghostwriter disinformation campaign (aka UNC1151) to the government of Belarus.

In August 2020, security experts from FireEye uncovered a disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting NATO by spreading fake news content on compromised news websites.

According to FireEye, the campaign tracked as GhostWriter, has been ongoing since at least March 2017 and is aligned with Russian security interests.

Unlike other disinformation campaigns, GhostWriter doesn’t spread through social networks, instead, threat actors behind this campaign abused compromised content management systems (CMS) of news websites or spoofed email accounts to disseminate fake news.

The operators behind Ghostwriter targeted Belarusian entities before the 2020 elections, some of the individuals (representatives of the Belarusian opposition) targeted by the nation-state actor were later arrested by the Belarusian government.

China-linked APT41 breached Taiwanese research institute

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

China-linked group APT41 breached a Taiwanese government-affiliated research institute using ShadowPad and Cobalt Strike.

Cisco Talos researchers reported that the China-linked group compromised a Taiwanese government-affiliated research institute. The experts attributed the attack with medium confidence to the APT41 group.

The campaign started as early as July 2023 and threat actors delivered the ShadowPad malware, Cobalt Strike, and other post-exploitation tools.

The sample of ShadowPad malware employed in this campaign exploited an outdated vulnerable version of Microsoft Office IME binary as a loader. The loader in turn loads the customized second-stage loader for launching the payload.

“Cisco Talos assesses with medium confidence that this campaign is carried out by APT41, alleged by the U.S. government to be comprised of Chinese nationals. This assessment is based primarily on overlaps in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), infrastructure and malware families used exclusively by Chinese APT groups.” reads the report published by Cisco Talos. “Talos’ analyses of the malware loaders used in this attack reveal that these are ShadowPad loaders. However, Talos has been unable to retrieve the final ShadowPad payloads used by the attackers.”

ShadowPad is a modular remote access trojan (RAT) sold exclusively to Chinese hacking groups. It has been publicly linked to APT41, a group believed to operate from Chengdu, China, and has also been used by other Chinese groups such as Mustang Panda and the Tonto Team.

The researchers were not able to determine the initial attack vector. The attackers compromised three hosts in the targeted environment and exfiltrated some documents from the network.

Attackers used a web shell to maintain persistence and drop additional payloads like ShadowPad and Cobalt Strike.

The attackers used a unique Cobalt Strike loader written in GoLang to bypass Windows Defender’s detection. This loader, derived from an anti-AV tool called CS-Avoid-Killing found on GitHub and written in Simplified Chinese, is promoted in various Chinese hacking forums and tutorials. The presence of Simplified Chinese file and directory paths suggests that the threat actors who created the loader are proficient in the language.

Attackers were also observed running PowerShell commands to execute scripts used to run the ShadowPad malware directly in memory and fetch Cobalt Strike malware from C2 server.

“During our investigation of this campaign, we encountered two distinct iterations of ShadowPad. While both iterations utilized the same sideloading technique, they each exploited different vulnerable legitimate binaries to initiate the ShadowPad loader.” continues the report. “The initial variant of the ShadowPad loader had been previously discussed in 2020, and some vendors had referred to it as ‘ScatterBee’. Its technical structure and the names of its multiple components have remained consistent with earlier reports. The more recent variant of the ShadowPad loader targeted an outdated and susceptible version of the Microsoft Office IME imecmnt.exe binary, which is over 13 years old.”

Talos also discovered that APT41 created a custom loader to inject a proof-of-concept for CVE-2018-0824 directly into memory. The threat actors used a remote code execution vulnerability to achieve local privilege escalation.

“During the compromise the threat actor attempts to exploit CVE-2018-0824, with a tool called UnmarshalPwn, which we will detail in the sections below.” continues the report. “The malicious actor is careful, in an attempt to avoid detection, during its activity executes “quser” which, when using RDP allows it to see who else is logged on the system. Hence the actor can stop its activity if any other use is on the system. Cisco Talos also noticed that once the backdoors are deployed the malicious actor will delete the webshell and guest account that allowed the initial access.”

By analyzing artifacts from this campaign, the researchers identified samples and infrastructure potentially used by the same threat actors in different campaigns. Sharing these findings could help the community to make connections and enhance further investigations.

Talos released Indicators of Compromise for this campaign on their GitHub repository.

North Korea-linked hackers target construction and machinery sectors with watering hole and supply chain attacks

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

South Korea’s National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) reported that North Korea-linked hackers hijacked VPN software updates to deploy malware.

South Korea’s national security and intelligence agencies, including the National Intelligence Service, the Prosecutor’s Office, the Police Agency, the Military Intelligence Command, and the Cyber Operations Command, have issued a joint cybersecurity advisory to warn that North Korea-linked hackers exploited VPN software update to install malware on target networks.

According to the South Korean authorities, the government of Pyongyang’s goal is to steal intellectual property and trade secrets from the South.

North Korea-linked actors hacking groups are targeting South Korea’s construction and machinery industries. The advisory provides details on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed by the attackers, as well as indicators of compromise (IoCs) for these attacks.

“Following the official announcement of the “Local Development 20×10 Policy” by Kim Jong-un at the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly on January 15 this year, North Korea has been pushing for the construction of modern industrial plants in 20 cities and counties annually. North Korean hacking organizations are also intensifying their efforts to support this policy.” reads the advisory. “It is suspected that North Korean hackers are stealing data from South Korea’s construction, machinery, and urban development sectors to support their industrial plant construction and local development plans.”

The North Korean APT groups Kimsuky and Andariel, both linked to the Reconnaissance General Bureau, are the main hacking groups involved. Their simultaneous and targeted attacks on specific sectors are considered unusual and experts highlighted that they necessitate careful preparation.

In January 2024, the Kimsuky APT group was spotted distributing malware through the website of a construction industry association in South Korea. The malware was concealed within security authentication software used during website login. The attack aimed at infecting PCs belonging to personnel from local governments, public institutions, and construction companies who accessed the site. This attack combined a “supply chain attack,” which involved tampering with legitimate distribution channels, with a “watering hole attack,” targeting websites frequently visited by construction and design professionals.

“When the tampered security authentication software installation file is executed, malware in the form of a DLL is run in the %APPDATA% directory, along with legitimate programs. This malware operates in the background to steal information, making it difficult for users to notice malicious activities. The malware, written in Go, is identified by some security firms as ‘TrollAgent’.” reads the advisory. “The malware has functionalities to collect system information, capture user screens, and gather information stored in browsers (credentials, cookies, bookmarks, history). It can also steal GPKI certificates, SSH keys, Sticky Notes, and FileZilla information from the infected PC.”

Another case detailed by the researchers took place in April 2024, when the Andariel hacking group exploited vulnerabilities in domestic VPN and server security software to distribute remote control malware, DoraRAT, to construction and machinery companies. The attackers manipulated the VPN client-server communication protocol to disguise malicious update files as legitimate ones. The compromised VPN client mistakenly accepted these files, leading to the execution of DoraRAT.

“The remote control malware (DoraRAT) used in the attack was simple and lightweight, focusing on basic functions like file upload/download and command execution. It was distributed using a watering hole technique, which increased its exposure. Unlike more sophisticated APT malware, DoraRAT had minimal functionality. Additionally, a file-stealing variant was identified, capable of exfiltrating large files related to machinery and equipment design.” continues the joint advisory. “Andariel also exploited vulnerabilities in server security products, demonstrating a trend of targeting IT management software for mass infections due to their high-level access and control.”

Below are the mitigations provided by North Korean authorities:

Organizations managing websites in sectors like construction and machinery should seek security assessments from relevant institutions if needed.
Ongoing security training for all organizational members, including IT and security staff, is crucial.
Keep operating systems and applications up-to-date, and use updated antivirus software with real-time detection.
Implement strict approval policies for software distribution to prevent vulnerabilities in automated deployment.
Stay informed about government cybersecurity advisories and act promptly on manufacturer recommendations.
Refer to guidelines for software supply chain security and software development security provided by national authorities.

Chinese StormBamboo APT compromised ISP to deliver malware

Posted on August 11, 2024 - August 11, 2024 by Maq Verma

A China-linked APT, tracked as StormBamboo, compromised an internet service provider (ISP) to poison software update mechanisms with malware.

Volexity researchers reported that a China-linked APT group, tracked as StormBamboo (aka Evasive Panda, Daggerfly, and StormCloud), successfully compromised an undisclosed internet service provider (ISP) in order to poison DNS responses for target organizations.

The threat actors targeted insecure software update mechanisms to install malware on macOS and Windows victim machines.

In mid-2023, Volexity discovered multiple malware infections affecting macOS and Windows systems within victim organizations. The company linked the attacks to StormBamboo APT group. Upon investigating the incidents, the researchers determined that a DNS poisoning attack at the ISP level caused the infection. The attackers altered DNS responses for domains related to software updates to deploy multiple malware families, including MACMA and POCOSTICK (MGBot). The attacker’s methods resemble those of DriftingBamboo, suggesting a possible connection between the two threat actors.

Macma is a modular backdoor that supports multiple functionalities, including device fingerprinting, executing commands, screen capture, keylogging, audio capture, uploading and downloading files.

Although Macma was widely used in cyber operations carried out by nation-state actors, it was not linked to a particular group.

“During one incident investigated by Volexity, it was discovered that StormBamboo poisoned DNS requests to deploy malware via an HTTP automatic update mechanism and poison responses for legitimate hostnames that were used as second-stage, command-and-control (C2) servers.” reads the report published by Volexity. “The DNS records were poisoned to resolve to an attacker-controlled server in Hong Kong at IP address 103.96.130[.]107. Initially, Volexity suspected the initial victim organization’s firewall may have been compromised. However, further investigation revealed the DNS poisoning was not performed within the target infrastructure, but further upstream at the ISP level.”

Volexity promptly alerted the ISP, which then investigated key traffic-routing devices on their network. After rebooting and taking parts of the network offline, the DNS poisoning stopped. The researchers were not able to identify a specific compromised device, however updating or deactivating various infrastructure components effectively ended the malicious activity.

“The logic behind the abuse of automatic updates is the same for all the applications: the legitimate application performs an HTTP request to retrieve a text-based file (the format varies) containing the latest application version and a link to the installer.” continues the report. “Since the attacker has control of the DNS responses for any given DNS name, they abuse this design, redirecting the HTTP request to a C2 server they control hosting a forged text file and a malicious installer. The AiTM workflow is shown below.”

StormBamboo targeted various software vendors with insecure update mechanisms, using complex methods to deploy malware. For example, they targeted 5KPlayer’s update process for the “youtube-dl” dependency to deliver a backdoored installer from their C2 servers. Once compromised systems, the attackers installed a malicious Google Chrome extension called ReloadText to steal browser cookies and email data.

“The incident described in this blog post confirms the supposition made by ESET concerning the infection vector for the POCOSTICK malware. The attacker can intercept DNS requests and poison them with malicious IP addresses, and then use this technique to abuse automatic update mechanisms that use HTTP rather than HTTPS.” concludes the report. “This method is similar to the attack vector Volexity previously observed being used by DriftingBamboo following the 0-day exploitation of Sophos Firewalls.”

North Korea Kimsuky Launch Phishing Attacks on Universities

Posted on August 8, 2024 - August 8, 2024 by Maq Verma

Cybersecurity analysts have uncovered critical details about the North Korean advanced persistent threat (APT) group Kimsuky, which has been targeting universities as part of its global espionage operations.

Kimsuky, active since at least 2012, primarily targets South Korean think tanks and government entities, though its reach extends to the US, the UK and other European nations. The group specializes in sophisticated phishing campaigns, often posing as academics or journalists to infiltrate networks and steal sensitive information.

Recent Findings and Tactics

According to a new advisory published by Resilience today, its analysts capitalized on Kimsuky’s operational security mistakes, which led to the collection of source code, login credentials and other crucial data.

The data revealed that Kimsuky has been phishing university staff, researchers and professors, aiming to access and exfiltrate valuable research and intelligence. Once inside university networks, the group was observed stealing information critical for North Korea, particularly given the country’s limited scientific community.

The group’s actions align with the objectives of the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), North Korea’s primary foreign intelligence agency.

Historically, Kimsuky has been linked to attempts to steal sensitive data, including nuclear research, healthcare innovations and pharmaceutical secrets. There is also evidence suggesting that Kimsuky engages in financially motivated cybercrime, potentially as a means to fund its espionage activities.

Resilience’s new findings shed light on Kimsuky’s methods, particularly its use of phishing pages that mimic legitimate university login portals. By altering the code of these pages, Kimsuky can capture the credentials of unsuspecting victims. Notably, the group has targeted institutions such as Dongduk University, Korea University and Yonsei University.

The operation also highlighted Kimsuky’s use of a custom tool called “SendMail,” which was deployed to send phishing emails using compromised email accounts. These emails were carefully crafted to deceive recipients into providing their login information, furthering Kimsuky’s espionage efforts.

According to Resilience, the breadth and depth of Kimsuky’s tactics underscore the persistent and evolving threat posed by state-backed cyber groups.

Recommendations for Organizations

To tackle this threat, the security firm recommended leveraging phish-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA), such as FIDO-compliant hardware tokens or push-based mobile applications.

Additionally, users should always double-check that the URL they are logging into matches the page they expect to be on, as some password managers can assist with this automatically.

Finally, organizations are encouraged to review and test Breach and Attack Simulation packages that simulate Kimsuky activity to better prepare for potential attacks.

New CMoon USB worm targets Russians in data theft attacks

Posted on August 8, 2024 - August 8, 2024 by Maq Verma

A new self-spreading worm named ‘CMoon,’ capable of stealing account credentials and other data, has been distributed in Russia since early July 2024 via a compromised gas supply company website.

According to Kaspersky researchers who discovered the campaign, CMoon can perform a broad range of functions, including loading additional payloads, snapping screenshots, and launching distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.

Judging from the distribution channel the threat actors used, their targeting scope is focused on high-value targets rather than random internet users, which indicates a sophisticated operation.

Distribution mechanism

Kaspersky says the infection chain begins when users click on links to regulatory documents (docx, .xlsx, .rtf, and .pdf) found on various pages of a company’s website that provides gasification and gas supply services to a Russian city.

The threat actors replaced the document links with links to malicious executables, which were also hosted on the site and delivered to the victims as self-extracting archives containing the original document and the CMoon payload, named after the original link.

“We have not seen other vectors of distribution of this malware, so we believe that the attack is aimed only at visitors to the particular site,” reports Kaspersky.

After the gas firm was notified of this compromise, the malicious files and links were removed from its website on July 25, 2024.

However, due to CMoon’s self-propagation mechanisms, its distribution may continue autonomously.

CMoon is a .NET worm that copies itself to a newly created folder named after the antivirus software it detected on the compromised device or one resembling a system folder if no AVs are detected.

The worm creates a shortcut on the Windows Startup directory to ensure it runs on system startup, securing persistence between reboots.

To avoid raising suspicions during manual user checks, it alters its files’ creation and modification dates to May 22, 2013.

The worm monitors for newly connected USB drives, and when any are hooked up on the infected machine, it replaces all files except for ‘LNKs’ and ‘EXEs’ with shortcuts to its executable.

CMoon also looks for interesting files stored on the USB drives and temporarily stores them in hidden directories (‘.intelligence’ and ‘.usb’) before these are exfiltrated to the attacker’s server.

CMoon features standard info-stealer functionality, targeting cryptocurrency wallets, data stored in web browsers, messenger apps, FTP and SSH clients, and document files in the USB or user folders that contain the text strings ‘secret,’ ‘service,’ or ‘password.’

An interesting and somewhat unusual feature is the targeting of files that might contain account credentials such as .pfx, .p12, .kdb, .kdbx, .lastpass, .psafe3, .pem, .key, .private, .asc, .gpg, .ovpn, and .log files.

Targeted data — **Targeted directories and data**
*Source: Kaspersky*

The malware can also download and execute additional payloads, capture screenshots of the breached device, and initiate DDoS attacks on specified targets.

Stolen files and system information are packaged and sent to an external server, where they are decrypted (RC4) and verified for their integrity using an MD5 hash.

**Generating the data package for exfiltration**
*Source: Kaspersky*

Kaspersky leaves open the possibility of more sites outside its current visibility distributing CMoon, so vigilance is advised.

No matter how targeted this campaign may be, the fact that the worm spreads autonomously means it could reach unintended systems and create the conditions for opportunistic attacks.

FBI: BlackSuit ransomware made over $500 million in ransom demands

Posted on August 8, 2024 - August 8, 2024 by Maq Verma

CISA and the FBI confirmed today that the Royal ransomware rebranded to BlackSuit and has demanded over $500 million from victims since it emerged more than two years ago.

This new information was shared as an update to a joint advisory published in March 2023, which says the BlackSuit gang has been active since September 2022.

However, this private group is believed to be a direct successor of the notorious Conti cybercrime syndicate and started as Quantum ransomware in January 2022.

While they initially used other gangs’ encryptors (like ALPHV/BlackCat), likely to avoid drawing unwanted attention, they deployed their own Zeon encryptor soon after and rebranded to Royal in September 2022.

After attacking the City of Dallas, Texas, in June 2023, the Royal ransomware operation began testing a new encryptor called BlackSuit amid rebranding rumors. Since then, they have been operating under the BlackSuit name, and Royal Ransomware attacks have stopped altogether.

“BlackSuit ransomware is the evolution of the ransomware previously identified as Royal ransomware, which was used from approximately September 2022 through June 2023. BlackSuit shares numerous coding similarities with Royal ransomware and has exhibited improved capabilities,” the FBI and CISA confirmed in a Wednesday update to their original advisory.

“Ransom demands have typically ranged from approximately $1 million to $10 million USD, with payment demanded in Bitcoin. BlackSuit actors have demanded over $500 million USD in total and the largest individual ransom demand was $60 million.”

In March 2023 and a subsequent November 2023 advisory update, the two agencies shared indicators of compromise and a list of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to help defenders block the gang’s attempts to deploy ransomware on their networks.

CISA and the FBI also linked the BlackSuit gang to attacks against over 350 organizations since September 2022 and at least $275 million in ransom demands.

The joint advisory was first issued after the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) security team revealed in December 2022 that the ransomware operation was behind multiple attacks targeting healthcare organizations across the United States.

Most recently, multiple sources told BleepingComputer that the BlackSuit ransomware gang was behind a massive CDK Global IT outage that disrupted operations at over 15,000 car dealerships across North America.

This widespread outage after last month’s attack forced CDK to shut down its IT systems and data centers to contain the incident and car dealerships to switch to pen and paper, making it impossible for buyers to purchase cars or receive service for already-bought vehicles.

McLaren hospitals disruption linked to INC ransomware attack

Posted on August 8, 2024 - August 8, 2024 by Maq Verma

On Tuesday, IT and phone systems at McLaren Health Care hospitals were disrupted following an attack linked to the INC Ransom ransomware operation.

McLaren is a non-profit healthcare system with annual revenues of over $6.5 billion, which operates a network of 13 hospitals across Michigan supported by a team of 640 physicians. It also has over 28,000 employees and works with 113,000 network providers throughout Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio.

“While McLaren Health Care continues to investigate a disruption to our information technology system, we want to ensure our teams are as prepared as possible to care for patients when they arrive,” a statement on the health system’s website reads.

“Patients with scheduled appointments should plan to attend those appointments unless they are contacted by a member of our care team.

McLaren hinted the hospitals had lost access to patient information databases when advising patients to bring detailed information about their current medications to appointments, including physician orders and printed results of recent lab tests. The health system also said it may have to reschedule some appointments and non-emergent or elective procedures “out of an abundance of caution.”

“We understand this situation may be frustrating to our patients – and to our team members – and we deeply and sincerely apologize for any inconvenience this may cause,” McLaren added. “We kindly ask for your patience while our caregivers and support teams work as diligently as ever to provide our communities the care they need and deserve.”

Even though McLaren has yet to disclose the nature of the incident, employees at McLaren Bay Region Hospital in Bay City have shared a ransom note warning that the hospital’s systems have been encrypted and stolen data will be published on INC RANSOM ransomware gang’s leak site if a ransom is not paid.

*Alleged McLaren ransom note (Thomas Barz)*

INC Ransom is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation that surfaced in July 2023 and has since targeted organizations in both the public and private sectors.

The list of victims includes education, healthcare, government, and industrial entities like Yamaha Motor Philippines, the U.S. division of Xerox Business Solutions (XBS), and Scotland’s National Health Service (NHS).

In May, a threat actor known as “salfetka” claimed to be selling source code of INC Ransom’s Windows and Linux/ESXi encrypter versions for $300,000 on the Exploit and XSS hacking forums.

Two months later, in July, malware analysts stated that the source code might have been purchased by a newly emerged ransomware group called Lynx ransomware. However, this could also be a rebranding effort, potentially allowing INC RANSOM to continue operations with less scrutiny from law enforcement.

BleepingComputer did an analysis of strings between the new Lynx ransomware encryptors and recent INC encryptors, and other than small changes, can confirm they are mostly the same.

INC vs Lynx ransomware string comparison — *INC vs. Lynx ransomware string comparison (BleepingComputer)*

In November 2023, McLaren notified almost 2.2 million people of a data breach that exposed their personal and health information between late July and August 2023.

Compromised data included names, Social Security numbers, health insurance and physician information, as well as Medicare/Medicaid, prescription/medication, and diagnostic results and treatment information.

The ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware group claimed the July 2023 attack behind the data breach on October 4.

Critical Progress WhatsUp RCE flaw now under active exploitation

Posted on August 8, 2024 - August 8, 2024 by Maq Verma

Threat actors are actively attempting to exploit a recently fixed Progress WhatsUp Gold remote code execution vulnerability on exposed servers for initial access to corporate networks.

The vulnerability leveraged in these attacks is CVE-2024-4885, a critical-severity (CVSS v3 score: 9.8) unauthenticated remote code execution flaw impacting Progress WhatsUp Gold 23.1.2 and older.

Proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits for CVE-2024-4885 are publicly available that target exposed WhatsUp Gold ‘/NmAPI/RecurringReport’ endpoints.

Threat monitoring organization Shadowserver Foundation reports that the attempts started on August 1, 2024, coming from six distinct IP addresses.

The CVE-2024-4885 RCE

Progress WhatsUp Gold is a network monitoring application that allows you to track the uptime and availability of servers and services running on them. However, as with any software, it should only be accessible internally, through a VPN, or via trusted IP addresses.

On June 25, 2024, Progress released a security bulletin warning about fifteen high and critical-severity bugs, including CVE-2024-4885, a 9.8-rated critical RCE flaw. Progress urged users to upgrade to the latest version, 23.1.3, to resolve the vulnerabilities.

CVE-2024-4885 is a remote code execution flaw in the ‘WhatsUp.ExportUtilities.Export. GetFileWithoutZip’ function, allowing unauthenticated attackers to execute commands with the privileges of the ‘iisapppool\\nmconsole’ user.

This is not an admin user but still has elevated permissions within the context of WhatsUp Gold. It can execute code on the server and even access the underlying system.

The vendor’s recommendations for those unable to upgrade to 23.1.3 were to monitor exploitation attempts at the’/NmAPI/RecurringReport’ endpoint and implement firewall rules to restrict access to it only to trusted IP addresses on ports 9642 and 9643.

The flaw was discovered by security researcher Sina Kheirkhah, who published a detailed technical write-up on his blog, including a proof-of-concept exploit.

The exploit sends a ‘TestRecurringReport’ request to an exposed WhatsUp Gold reporting endpoint that contains a specially crafted configuration. This configuration includes the URL to an attacker-controlled web server and the user ID the targeted server should respond with.

When the targeted server responds to the attacker’s server, it will include the user name and encrypted password associated with the user ID.

Kheirkhah’s exploit uses this information to make and receive further requests and resposnes with the targeted server to ultimately cause a file to be written on the server, which is then launched remotely for code execution, as illustrated below.

As the final payload in the exploit is delivered from attacker-controlled servers, it is unknown at this time what payloads are being created on targeted servers. However, similar activity in the past created webshells on the targeted devices for easier access and persistence.

Given the active exploitation status, WhatsUp Gold admins should apply the latest security updates or mitigations and continue monitoring for suspicious activity.

The WhatsUp Gold server should also be placed behind a firewall and accessible only internally or by trusted IP addresses.

INTERPOL recovers over $40 million stolen in a BEC attack

Posted on August 8, 2024 - August 8, 2024 by Maq Verma

A global stop-payment mechanism created by INTERPOL successfully recovered over $40 million stolen in a BEC attack on a company in Singapore.

INTERPOL says this is the largest recovery of funds stolen through a business email compromise (BEC) scam.

BEC scams are a type of cyberattack in which cybercriminals attempt to redirect legitimate corporate payments to an attacker-controlled bank account.

These attacks are conducted by threat actors compromising a vendor’s or company’s email address to trick billing departments into approving new banking information where payment should be sent. When the threat actors receive the payment, they quickly use money mules to drain the account or transfer it to numerous other accounts under their control.

The 2023 FBI IC3 Report says that they received 21,489 complaints with $2.9 billion in reported losses due to business email compromise in 2023.

I-GRIP recovers over $40 million

According to an announcement by INTERPOL, a commodity firm based in Singapore fell victim to a BEC attack after receiving what they thought was an email from their supplier.

“On 15 July, the firm had received an email from a supplier requesting that a pending payment be sent to a new bank account based in Timor Leste,” reads the announcement.

“The email, however, came from a fraudulent account spelled slightly different to the supplier’s official email address.”

Thinking this was a legitimate request, the firm wired $42.3 million to the attacker-controlled bank accounts, only to realize four days later that they had fallen for an attack.

After reporting the attack to the Singapore authorities, law enforcement used INTERPOL’s Global Rapid Intervention of Payments (I-GRIP) to request assistance from authorities in Timor Leste and recover $39 million from the BEC attack.

Further investigations by the Timor Leste authorities led to the arrest of seven suspects and the recovery of an additional $2 million, bringing the total recovered amount to $41 million.

In June, a global police operation called “Operation First Light” arrested 3,950 people for their suspected involvement in phishing, pig butchering scams, fake online shopping sites, and romance and impersonation scams.

I-GRIP was also used during the operation to recover millions of dollars stolen by the threat actors. Since its launch in 2022, it has been used to recover over $500 million stolen through fraud and cybercrime.

Windows Update downgrade attack “unpatches” fully-updated systems

Posted on August 8, 2024 - August 8, 2024 by Maq Verma

SafeBreach security researcher Alon Leviev revealed at Black Hat 2024 that two zero-days could be exploited in downgrade attacks to “unpatch” fully updated Windows 10, Windows 11, and Windows Server systems and reintroduce old vulnerabilities.

Microsoft issued advisories on the two unpatched zero-days (tracked as CVE-2024-38202 and CVE-2024-21302) in coordination with the Black Hat talk, providing mitigation advice until a fix is released.

In downgrade attacks, threat actors force an up-to-date target device to roll back to older software versions, reintroducing vulnerabilities that can be exploited to compromise the systems.

SafeBreach security researcher Alon Leviev discovered that the Windows update process could be compromised to downgrade critical OS components, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs) and the NT Kernel. Even though all of these components were now out of date, when checking with Windows Update, the OS reported that it was fully updated, with recovery and scanning tools unable to detect any issues.

By exploiting the zero-day vulnerabilities, he could also downgrade Credential Guard’s Secure Kernel and Isolated User Mode Process and Hyper-V’s hypervisor to expose past privilege escalation vulnerabilities.

“I discovered multiple ways to disable Windows virtualization-based security (VBS), including its features such as Credential Guard and Hypervisor-Protected Code integrity (HVCI), even when enforced with UEFI locks. To my knowledge, this is the first time VBS’s UEFI locks have been bypassed without physical access,” Leviev revealed.

“As a result, I was able to make a fully patched Windows machine susceptible to thousands of past vulnerabilities, turning fixed vulnerabilities into zero-days and making the term “fully patched” meaningless on any Windows machine in the world.”

As Leviev said, this downgrade attack is undetectable because it cannot be blocked by endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions, and it’s also invisible since Windows Update reports that a device is fully updated (despite being downgraded).

No patches after six months

Leviev unveiled his “Windows Downdate” downgrade attack six months after reporting the vulnerabilities to Microsoft in February as part of a coordinated responsible disclosure process.

Microsoft said today that it’s still working on a fix for the Windows Update Stack Elevation of Privilege (CVE-2024-38202) and Windows Secure Kernel Mode Elevation of Privilege (CVE-2024-21302) vulnerabilities used by Leviev to elevate privileges, create malicious updates, and reintroduce security flaws by replacing Windows system files with older versions.

As the company explains, the CVE-2024-38202 Windows Backup privilege escalation vulnerability enables attackers with basic user privileges to “unpatch” previously mitigated security bugs or bypass Virtualization Based Security (VBS) features. Attackers with admin privileges can exploit the CVE-2024-21302 privilege escalation flaw to replace Windows system files with outdated and vulnerable versions.

Microsoft said it’s not currently aware of any attempts to exploit this vulnerability in the wild and advised implementing recommendations shared in two security advisories published today to help reduce the risk of exploitation until a security update is released.

“I was able to show how it was possible to make a fully patched Windows machine susceptible to thousands of past vulnerabilities, turning fixed vulnerabilities into zero-days and making the term ‘fully patched’ meaningless on any Windows machine in the world,” Leviev said.

“We believe the implications are significant not only to Microsoft Windows, which is the world’s most widely used desktop OS, but also to other OS vendors that may potentially be susceptible to downgrade attacks.”

Update August 07, 17:27 EDT: A Microsoft spokesperson sent the following statement after the story was published.

We appreciate the work of SafeBreach in identifying and responsibly reporting this vulnerability through a coordinated vulnerability disclosure. We are actively developing mitigations to protect against these risks while following an extensive process involving a thorough investigation, update development across all affected versions, and compatibility testing, to ensure maximized customer protection with minimized operational disruption.

Microsoft also told BleepingComputer that they are working on an update that will revoke outdated, unpatched Virtualization Based Security (VBS) system files to mitigate the attack. However, it will take time to test this update due to the large number of files that will be impacted.

AWS Adds Passkey Support for Enhanced Security, Enforces MFA for Root Users

Posted on August 8, 2024 - August 8, 2024 by Maq Verma

AWS has recently announced two new security features. First, passkeys can now be used for multi-factor authentication (MFA) for root and IAM users, providing additional security beyond just a username and password. Second, AWS now requires MFA for root users, starting with the root user account in an AWS Organization. This requirement will be expanded to other accounts throughout the year.

Sébastien Stormacq, principal developer advocate at AWS, discussed these announcements related to MFA in a blog post. Stormacq stated that a passkey, used in FIDO2 authentication, is a pair of cryptographic keys created on your device when you sign up for a service or website. It consists of two linked cryptographic keys: a public key stored by the service provider and a private key stored securely on your device (like a security key) or synced across your devices through services like iCloud Keychain, Google accounts, or password managers like 1Password.

As another part of the security-related announcement, Stormacq mentioned that AWS is now enforcing multi-factor authentication (MFA) for root users on certain accounts. This initiative, initially announced last year by Amazon’s chief security officer Stephen Schmidt, aims to enhance security for the most sensitive accounts.

AWS has initiated this rollout gradually, starting with a limited number of AWS Organizations management accounts and expanding over time to encompass most accounts. Users without MFA enabled on their root account will receive a prompt to activate it upon login, with a grace period before it becomes mandatory.

To enable passkey MFA, users will need to access the IAM section of the AWS console. After selecting the desired user, locate the MFA section and click “Assign MFA device”. It’s important to note that enabling multiple MFA devices for a user can improve account recovery options.

Source: AWS adds passkey multi-factor authentication (MFA) for root and IAM users

Next, name the device and select “Passkey or security key”. If a password manager with passkey support is in use, it will offer to generate and store the passkey. Otherwise, the browser will provide options (depending on the OS and browser). For example, on a macOS machine using a Chromium-based browser, a prompt to use Touch ID to create and store the passkey within the iCloud Keychain is presented. The experience from this point onward varies based on the user’s selections.

Source: AWS adds passkey multi-factor authentication (MFA) for root and IAM users

In a Reddit discussion regarding the announcement, one of the users noted a potential discrepancy: related to the release documentation mentioning Identity Center over IAM, but the newly-added Passkey support did not appear to extend to Identity Center. The discussion in the thread further concluded that the release primarily added support for FIDO2 Platform Authenticators (Passkeys) in addition to existing support for Roaming Authenticators (security keys).

Passkeys for multi-factor authentication are currently available for AWS users in all regions except China. Additionally, the enforcement of multi-factor authentication for root users is in effect in all regions except the two China regions (Beijing and Ningxia) and AWS GovCloud (US), as these regions operate without root users.

Microsoft Entra Suite Now Generally Available: Identity and Security Based Upon Zero-Trust Models

Posted on August 8, 2024 - August 8, 2024 by Maq Verma

Microsoft has announced the general availability of its Entra Suite. According to the company, the suite provides a solution that integrates identity and security, facilitating a more unified approach to security operations.

The Entra Suite is built to streamline the implementation of zero-trust security models. Zero-trust is a framework where trust is never assumed, and verification is continuously enforced. By integrating identity management with security operations, Microsoft aims to make zero-trust adoption more seamless for organizations.

The company states that the suite focuses on providing secure access for the workforce, marking the second stage in the company’s vision for a universal trust fabric for the era of AI. In an earlier company blog post, Joy Chik writes:

Once your organization has established foundational defenses, the next priority is expanding the Zero Trust strategy by securing access for your hybrid workforce. Flexible work models are now mainstream, and they pose new security challenges as boundaries between corporate networks and the open Internet are blurred. At the same time, many organizations increasingly have a mix of modern cloud applications and legacy on-premises resources, leading to inconsistent user experiences and security controls.

In addition, the company writes in the announcement blog post:

By incorporating the principles of Zero Trust—verify explicitly, use least privileged access, and assume breach—the Microsoft Entra Suite and the Microsoft unified security operations platform help leaders and stakeholders for security operations, identity, IT, and network infrastructure understand their organization’s overall Zero Trust posture.

Microsoft Entra Suite offers several identity-centric solutions, including private access for securing private resources, internet access for protecting against internet threats, ID Governance for automating identity management, ID Protection for real-time identity compromise prevention, and Verified ID for real-time identity verification.

Microsoft Enterprise Suite allows organizations to unify Conditional Access policies, ensure minimal access privileges (least privileges) for all users, enhance the user experience for in-office and remote workers, and reduce the complexity and cost of managing security tools.

Conditional Access Microsoft Entra (Source: Screenshot YouTube First Look on Microsoft Entra Suite)

In a First Look on Microsoft Entra Suite YouTube video, MVP Andy Malone explains the conditional access policies amongst the other features like:

What conditional access does is that it’s part of Microsoft’s Zero Trust Technologies. So, in other words, you have to go to verify every user, every application, and every device on your network. Conditional access policies will help you do that.

The Microsoft Entra Suite is $12 per user per month, and the Microsoft Entra P1 is a licensing and technical prerequisite. The pricing page has more details.

Introducing New SKUs for Microsoft Azure Bastion: Developer and Premium Options Now Available

Posted on August 8, 2024 - August 8, 2024 by Maq Verma

Microsoft recently announced new SKUs for its Azure Bastion service: a Developer SKU that is now generally available (GA) after its public preview last year and a premium SKU being rolled out in a public preview.

Microsoft Azure Bastion is a fully managed Platform as a Service (PaaS) that offers seamless RDP and SSH connectivity to virtual machines accessed directly in the Azure portal. The Developer SKU is designed for Dev/Test users who need secure VM connections without requiring extra features, configuration, or scaling. The new premium SKU offers advanced recording, monitoring, and auditing capabilities for customers managing highly sensitive workloads.

With the Bastion Developer SKU, there’s no need to allocate dedicated resources to your customer VNET. Instead, it uses a shared pool of resources managed internally by Microsoft, ensuring secure connectivity to their VMs. Users can access their VMs directly through the connect experience on the VM blade in the portal, with support for RDP/SSH on the portal and SSH-only for CLI sessions.

Isabelle Morris, a product manager of Azure Networking, explains in a Tech Community blog post:

This service is designed to simplify and enhance the process of accessing your Azure Virtual Machines by eliminating the complexities, high costs, and security concerns often associated with alternative methods.

Overview of the Azure Bastion Developer SKU Architecture (Source: Microsoft Learn)

Aaron Tsang, product manager, Microsoft, writes about the public preview of the premium SKU:

Our first set of features will focus on ensuring private connectivity and graphical recordings of virtual machines connected through Azure Bastion.

Azure Bastion’s private-only enables inbound connections using a private IP address, which is beneficial for customers seeking to minimize public endpoints or adhere to strict organizational policies. This allows private connectivity from on-premises to Azure virtual machines when using ExpressRoute private peering.

Overview of the Azure Bastion Private Only Deployment (Source: Microsoft Learn)

The private-only deployment feature received positive feedback from the community. Joe Parr comments:

A key feature for me is the private-only mode—no more internet-routable deployments of Bastion.

The graphical session recording in Azure Bastion visually records all virtual machine sessions, storing them in a customer-designated storage account for direct viewing in the Azure Bastion resource blade. This feature provides added monitoring for virtual machine sessions, allowing customers to review recordings if any anomalies occur. According to Aquib Qureshi, a technology specialist at Microsoft, the feature was one of the most requested.

Lastly, Azure Bastion pricing is based on hourly rates determined by SKUs, instances (scale units), and data transfer fees. Hourly pricing commences upon Bastion deployment, irrespective of outbound data usage. The pricing page provides more details.

AWS Launches Open-Source Agent for AWS Secrets Manager

Posted on August 8, 2024 - August 8, 2024 by Maq Verma

Amazon Web Services (AWS) has launched a new open-source agent for AWS Secrets Manager. According to the company, this agent simplifies the process of retrieving secrets from AWS Secrets Manager, enabling secure and streamlined application access.

The Secrets Manager Agent is an open-source tool that allows your applications to retrieve secrets from a local HTTP service instead of reaching out to Secrets Manager over the network. It comes with customizable configuration options, including time to live, cache size, maximum connections, and HTTP port, allowing developers to tailor the agent to their application’s specific requirements. Additionally, the agent provides built-in protection against Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to ensure security when calling the agent within a computing environment.

The Secrets Manager Agent retrieves and stores secrets in memory, allowing applications to access the cached secrets directly instead of calling Secrets Manager. This means that an application can retrieve its secrets from the local host. It’s important to note that the Secrets Manager Agent can only make read requests to the Secrets Manager and cannot modify the secrets, while the AWS SDK allows more.

A respondent on a Reddit thread explained the difference between the agent and AWS SDK, which, for instance, allows the creation of secrets:

This one caches secrets so that if the same secret is requested multiple times within the TTL, only a single API call is made, and the cached secret is returned for any subsequent requests.

In addition, on a Hacker News thread, a respondent wrote:

If I looked at what this does and none of the surrounding discussion/documentation, I’d say this is more about simplifying using Secrets Manager properly than for any security purpose.

To use the secret manager “properly,” in most cases, you’ll need to pull in the entire AWS SDK, maybe authenticate it, make your requests to the secret manager, cache values for some sort of lifetime before refreshing, etc.

To use it “less properly,” you can inject the values in environment variables, but then there’s no way to pick up changes, and rotating secrets becomes a _project_.

Or spin this up, and that’s all handled. It’s so simple you can even use it from your shell scripts.

Lastly, there are several open-source secret management tools available in the Cloud, like Infisical, an open-source secret management platform that developers can use to centralize their application configuration and secrets like API keys and database credentials, or Conjur, which provides an open-source interface to securely authenticate, control, and audit non-human access across tools, applications, containers, and cloud environments via robust secrets management. In addition to these, there are proprietary secret management solutions like HashiCorp Vault, Azure Key Vault, Google Secret Manager, and AWS Secrets Manager.

Microsoft Introduces the Public Preview of Flex Consumption Plan for Azure Functions at Build

Posted on August 8, 2024 - August 8, 2024 by Maq Verma

At the annual Build conference, Microsoft announced the flex consumption plan for Azure Functions, which brings users fast and large elastic scale, instance size selection, private networking, and higher concurrency control.

The Flex Consumption Plan is a new Azure Functions hosting plan that uses the familiar serverless consumption-based billing model (pay for what you use). It provides users with more flexibility and customization options without sacrificing existing capabilities. According to the company, users can build serverless functions with this plan, leading to higher throughput, improved reliability, better performance, and enhanced security according to their needs.

Flex Consumption (Source: Tech Community blog post)

Thiago Almeida, who works for the Azure Functions engineering team, writes:

Flex Consumption is built on the latest Functions host especially optimized for scale, a brand-new backend infrastructure called Legion, and a new version of our internal scaling service. It is now available in preview in 12 regions and supports .NET 8 Isolated, Python 3.11 and Python 3.10, Java 17 and Java 11, Node 20 LTS, and PowerShell 7.4 (Preview).

Flex Consumption offers a range of scaling capabilities, including multiple instance memory choices, per-instance concurrency control, per-function scaling, “Always Ready” instances, and the ability to scale out to up to 1000 instances per app. In addition, users can securely access Virtual Network (VNet)-protected services from their function app and secure their function app to their VNet. There is no extra cost for VNet support; users can share the same subnet between multiple Flex Consumption apps.

Besides Flex Consumption’s scaling and networking features, other features are available, including Azure Load Testing integration for Function apps. This integration allows users to set up load tests against their HTTP-based functions easily. Flex Consumption apps can also opt-in to emit platform logs, metrics, and traces using Open Telemetry semantics to Azure Application Insights or other OLTP-compliant endpoints. Finally, it’s important to note that Flex Consumption has no execution time limit enforced by the functions host. However, it’s still essential to write robust functions as there are no execution time guarantees during public preview, and the platform can still cancel function executions.

A cloud solution architect from Germany tweeted on the announcement of the new plan:

Finally… Too late, but better than never. We lost a huge project against AWS-Competitor due to the lack of these capabilities two years ago. We developed one year ago, and the customer decided to switch to AWS due to the lack of possibilities for scale to zero and VNet Integration at once.

While Miroslav Janeski, a technical director at Init Norway, concludes in a blog post:

Azure Functions Flex Consumption represents a significant leap forward in serverless computing. It addresses long-standing challenges while maintaining cost efficiency and scalability benefits. As cloud-native applications evolve, innovations like these will pave the way for even greater advancements.

Lastly, the Flex Consumption Plan operates on a consumption-based pricing model. Charges are applicable for on-demand instances during function execution and for optional “Always Ready” instances. The plan includes a monthly free grant of 250,000 requests and 100,000 GB-s of resource consumption per subscription.